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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Ephrata, Pennsylvania community hospital discharged 
Pierce Nye from its mental ward, few people suspected that he planned 
to invade the nation’s nuclear infrastructure.  But on February 11, 1993, 
he crashed his Plymouth station wagon through two fences and into the 
“protected area” of Three Mile Island in what the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) at that time labeled “the most serious intrusion on 
record in this country.”1  In the wake of this intrusion and the World 
Trade Center bombing of the same year, the public and the government 
recognized the need to upgrade security at the nation’s nuclear power 
plants. 2   In 2001—following the terrorist attacks in New York and 
                                                                                                             
 1 Matthew L. Wald, Gate Crasher Shakes Up Nuclear Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
1993, at A16.  The “protected area” of a nuclear power plant is an area guarded by 
physical barriers that is accessible only by official personnel, vehicles, and materials.  10 
C.F.R. § 73.55 (2011). 
 2 See The World Trade Center Bombing, The Three Mile Island Intrusion and the 
Potential Threat to U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean 
Air and Nuclear Regulation of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 103d Cong. 1 
(1993) (statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, RAND Corporation); Protection Against 
Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) 
(codified at 10 C.F.R. part 73) (increasing security at nuclear facilities following the 
World Trade Center bombing and a vehicular incursion at Three Mile Island). 
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Washington, D.C.—the NRC considered the threat of an airborne attack 
on the nuclear infrastructure, and modified its security requirements 
accordingly. 3   Following the 2001 attacks, however, many states, 
organizations and private citizens began to demand that the NRC account 
for the possible environmental effects of a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
power plant or nuclear fuel storage facility as part of its licensing 
process.4  Though the NRC, an administrative agency, typically rejected 
such demands, a split between the Ninth and Third Circuits, reviewing 
the decisions of the NRC, has pushed this issue into the national 
spotlight. 
In 1974, Congress established the NRC to promote the civilian use 
of nuclear power while protecting the public and the environment from 
its potentially harmful effects. 5    Since its inception the NRC has 
designated security and the environmental impacts of its facilities among 
its top priorities.6  As part of the licensing process, the NRC provides a 
forum for private citizens to address their concerns and participate in the 
construction and licensing of nuclear facilities. 7   The National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires federal agencies to 
establish a procedure for examining the significant environmental 
                                                                                                             
 3 See, e.g. Security Zone, San Diego, CA, 67 Fed. Reg. 5480 (Feb. 6, 2002) 
(codified at 33 C.F.R. part 165) (establishing a temporary security zone in the waters 
immediately adjacent to the San Onofre (Cal.) nuclear generating station); Entergy 
Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR § 
2.206, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,467 (Nov. 22, 2002) (stating that the NRC has partially granted a 
request for a security upgrade in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but 
finding that the existing emergency response plans are sufficient to respond to a terror 
event); Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately), 67 Fed. Reg. 65,150 (Oct. 23, 
2002) (modifying license requirements for nuclear fuel storage facilities following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, specifics of which were not released to the 
public, but supplement the existing requirements enumerated in 10 C.F.R. § 73.55); All 
Operating Power Reactor Licensees; Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately), 
67 Fed. Reg. 9792 (Mar. 4, 2002) (modifying license requirements for nuclear generating 
stations following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, specifics of which were not 
released to the public, but supplement the existing requirements enumerated in 10 C.F.R. 
§ 73.55). 
 4 See generally N.J. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 
F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007); Private Fuel 
Storage L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002). 
 5 About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://nrc.gov/about-nrc.html 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2011). 
 6 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2023 (2006); Energy Reorganization Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5879 (2006) (creating the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 10 
C.F.R. § 51.10 (2011). 
 7 JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI, THE STATE AND NUCLEAR POWER: CONFLICT AND CONTROL 
IN THE WESTERN WORLD 76 (The University of Washington Press, 1984). 
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impacts of their actions. 8   One requirement of this procedure is the 
publication of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”)—a detailed 
written report that discusses the significant environmental impacts of a 
proposed federal action.9  The satisfactory preparation and disclosure of 
an EIS by the NRC fulfills the “twin aims” of NEPA: (1) “to inject 
environmental considerations into the [NRC]’s decisionmaking process,” 
and (2) “to inform the public that the agency has considered 
environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.”10  Opponents of 
nuclear power frequently challenge the thoroughness of the NRC’s 
compliance with NEPA by claiming that the NRC failed to adequately 
review a particular environmental impact in its EIS. 
In a 2002 administrative decision, Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.,11 
the NRC responded to growing concerns for plant security by addressing 
the issue of whether the threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is 
an environmental effect to be considered in the construction, licensing, 
and operation of a nuclear power plant or fuel storage facility, as 
required by NEPA.12  Opposing the licensing of a nuclear fuel storage 
facility, the state of Utah claimed that a nuclear facility’s EIS must 
discuss the potential environmental impact of a terrorist attack on that 
facility.13  The NRC held that the environmental impact of a terrorist act 
on a nuclear plant is not a factor subject to EIS analysis because (1) 
consideration of terrorism conflicts with NEPA’s goals and the rule of 
reason, 14  (2) the NRC cannot adequately determine the risk of an 
attack,15 (3) NEPA does not require analysis of a “worst case scenario,”16 
and (4) NEPA’s public process is an inappropriate forum for review of 
sensitive security issues.17 
                                                                                                             
 8 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006) 
(declaring it to be federal policy “to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a 
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,” and 
establishing a procedure for agencies to examine the significant environmental impacts of 
its actions). 
 9 40 C.F.R § 1502.1 (2011).  The EIS is generally preceded by an environmental 
assessment that is a concise document that provides evidence and analysis “for 
determining whether to prepare an [EIS] or a finding of no significant impact.”  40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.9 (2011). 
 10 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 
(1981). 
 11 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002). 
 12 Id. at 340. 
 13 Id. at 345. 
 14 Id. at 348–50. 
 15 Id. at 350–51. 
 16 Id. at 351–54. 
 17 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 354–57. 
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The Ninth Circuit departed from the NRC’s Private Fuel Storage 
precedent in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,18 when it held that an EIS must address the environmental 
consequences of a terrorist attack on the proposed nuclear facility.19  
Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit in New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission,20 affirmed the NRC’s decision that an EIS does 
not need to include a terrorism review.21  With its decision in New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection, the Third Circuit created a 
circuit split between itself and the Ninth Circuit regarding whether the 
NRC must consider the threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility in 
an EIS for a nuclear power plant or nuclear fuel storage facility.22 
Part II of this Comment discusses the purpose of NEPA, relevant 
Supreme Court precedent, and the law according to the Third and Ninth 
Circuits in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and 
Mothers for Peace, respectively.  Part III offers an analysis of the circuit 
split in light of the binding law and regulatory framework.  It also 
explores the ramifications of following either circuit’s approach and 
presents possible courses of action that address issues raised by this 
debate.  This Comment concludes by arguing that the Third Circuit in 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection correctly resolved 
this issue by holding that an EIS need not include a discussion of 
terrorism as an environmental impact of a nuclear facility. 
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Civilian Use of Nuclear Power 
President Eisenhower initiated the “Atoms for Peace” program 
shortly after his inauguration in 1953.23  The aim of this program—to 
transfer nuclear technology from the military to civilian enterprises—
vested the development of nuclear energy in private companies.24  The 
Atomic Energy Act of 195425  (AEA) established the Atomic Energy 
Commission (“AEC”), which regulated all aspects of private nuclear 
                                                                                                             
 18 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 19 Id. at 1035. 
 20 561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 21 Id. at 142. 
 22 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 554 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
 23 FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 997 (3d 2010). 
 24 Id. 
 25 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2023 (2006). 
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energy.26  The Energy Reorganization Act of 197427 abolished the AEC 
and placed the regulatory and licensing authority of the AEC within the 
newly established NRC, while the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (the predecessor to the Department of Energy) retained 
the AEC’s research and development functions.28 
The public initially approved of the use of nuclear power when the 
first commercial plant opened in 1957.29  But growing fears about the 
risks of nuclear power resulted in new safety requirements and more 
complex procedures for plant licensure.30  Despite the legal process the 
NRC provided for citizen participation, some interested parties have 
preferred a more direct approach.  For example, in May 1977, the 
Clamshell Alliance, a New England-based coalition of anti-nuclear 
groups, coordinated the first forceful occupation of a nuclear plant in the 
United States at New Hampshire’s Seabrook plant, which resulted in the 
arrests of 1,414 protestors.31  Similarly, four years later, police arrested 
1,453 protesters at California’s Diablo Canyon when demonstrators tried 
to block land and sea access to that plant.32 
The growing public concerns proved to be legitimate in 1979 when 
a series of mechanical malfunctions at Three Mile Island produced the 
“nation’s worst nuclear accident.”33  The release of radioactive materials 
into the water and air during the Three Mile Island meltdown 
demonstrated that serious accidents present a material threat to the 
environment and illuminated the potential harmful consequences of 
nuclear power.  No longer was a major incident merely hypothetical; one 
had actually occurred.  Without appropriate measures by the NRC, 
accidents would likely occur again.34  The NRC responded by studying 
the risk of future accidents and its ability to protect the public and the 
                                                                                                             
 26 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 23 at 997–98; Our History, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html (last visited Jan. 
16, 2011). 
 27 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5879 (2006). 
 28 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 343 
(Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 13th ed. 2008). 
 29 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 998. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; Arrests at Diablo Canyon Pass Total at Seabrook, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1981, 
at A16. 
 32 Arrests at Diablo Canyon Pass Total at Seabrook, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1981, at 
A16. 
 33 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 655–56 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations 
omitted) (describing the Three Mile Island incident, its causes, and effects). 
 34 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 741 
(1983). 
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environment from them.  Ultimately, the NRC implemented appropriate 
changes to its evacuation and disaster management plans.35 
In the early 1990s, several incidents throughout the nation either 
directly or indirectly implicated the NRC’s security duties.  For example, 
the truck bombings of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City 
Federal Building in 1993 and 1995, respectively, demonstrated the active 
and actual threat of land-based terrorist attacks to valuable installations.  
Additionally, Pierce Nye’s invasion of Three Mile Island further 
demonstrated the vulnerability of the nation’s nuclear industry.36  These 
events, in addition to the protestor demonstrations at Seabrook and 
Diablo Canyon, illustrate the difficult task faced by the NRC in 
safeguarding the nation’s nuclear infrastructure. 
In recent years, the issue of terrorism has dominated the discourse 
on plant security and environmental risks.  Until 1993, Americans 
generally considered terrorism to be an act that occurred abroad.37  The 
bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, 38  however, 
revealed a weakness in American domestic security and reignited a 
twenty-year-old debate on the vulnerability of nuclear facilities. 39  
Following the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.,40 the 
debate again intensified.  Design-based requirements of nuclear plants in 
susceptible areas require that they be built to withstand hurricanes and 
earthquakes. 41   Prior to 2001, however, no design-based mandates 
existed that required nuclear plants to be able to withstand large aircraft 
crashes.42  In 2001, the NRC began an intensive review of the design-
based requirements at nuclear facilities and implemented increasingly 
stringent design-based and physical security standards.43  The NRC’s 
scrutiny generally looks beyond the possibility of an attack or invasion 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. 
 36 Matthew L. Wald, Gate Crasher Shakes Up Nuclear Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
1993, at A16. 
 37 Hoffman, supra note 2. 
 38 Robert D. McFadden, EXPLOSION AT THE TWIN TOWERS: The Overview, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, § 1, at 1. 
 39 Hoffman, supra note 2. 
 40 Serge Schmemann, U.S. ATTACKED: President Vows to Exact Punishment for 
‘Evil,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1. 
 41 MARK HOLT & ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34331, NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT SECURITY AND VULNERABILITIES 4 (2010). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See sources cited supra note 3; San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2006).  But see Riverkeeper, Inc. 
v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 161–63 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing an environmental protection 
group’s demands that New York’s Indian Point nuclear generation plant be protected by a 
ten mile radius no-fly zone and defenses sufficient to defend this zone from an 
approaching aircraft). 
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and examines all potential environmental harms, including tsunamis, 
floods, and tornadoes.44  The NRC refuses, however, to require nuclear 
facilities to assess the hypothetical effects of terrorism as an articulable 
environmental hazard.45 
B.  The NRC’s Obligations Under NEPA 
The AEA grants the NRC the exclusive authority to regulate the 
safety of nuclear facilities and charges the NRC with ensuring that “the 
utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accord 
with the common defense and security and will provide adequate 
protection to the health and safety of the public.”46  To achieve this end, 
the NRC may promulgate rules, regulations, and orders, “as the 
Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the common 
defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or 
property.”47  Examples of the NRC’s compliance with this duty pervade 
its NEPA-enforcing regulations,48 its physical protection requirements49 
and its plant licensing procedures,50 to name a few. 
Passed in 1969, NEPA established “a broad national commitment to 
protecting and promoting environmental quality.” 51   Through NEPA, 
Congress declared a national policy intended to foster the productive and 
harmonious coexistence of man and nature, and to fulfill the nation’s 
present and future social and economic needs.52  Agencies implement 
this policy through a series of “action-forcing” procedures that require 
                                                                                                             
 44 See, Fact Sheet on Seismic Issues for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-
seismic-issues.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011); Dina Cappiello & Matthew Daly, Wolf 
Creek plant not entirely twister-proof, THE WICHITA EAGLE, May 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.kansas.com/2011/05/27/1866781/wolf-creek-plant-not-
entirely.html#storylink=misearch; A.G. Sulzberger & Matthew Wald, Flooding Brings 
Worries Over Two Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A19; Tom Zeller, Jr., 
U.S. Nuclear Plants Have Same Risks, and Backups, as Japan Counterparts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2011, at A10.. 
 45 See Amergen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 126–29 (2007); Private Fuel Storage, 
L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 344–46 (2002). 
 46 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2006). 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (2006). 
 48 10 C.F.R. pt 51 (2011). 
 49 10 C.F.R. pt 73 (2011). 
 50 10 C.F.R. pt 2 (2011). 
 51 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989). 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).  NEPA also established the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), which promulgates regulations interpreting NEPA and guides agencies in 
determining which actions are subject to an EIS.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4341–4357 (1970) 
(establishing the purpose, duties, jurisdiction and structure of the CEQ). 
2011] BETWEEN NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR TERROR 231 
the agencies to take a “hard look”53 at the effects of their actions on the 
environment and to disseminate the relevant information to the public. 54  
In short, NEPA serves two paramount aims: (1) to require the federal 
agency to discuss environmental issues in its decision-making process, 
and (2) to assure the public that it has adequately discussed 
environmental considerations.55 
The completion and public disclosure of an EIS ensures that the 
NRC complies with its duty to serve NEPA’s twin aims.56  Pursuant to 
NEPA, the agency responsible for any major federal action that will 
significantly affect the human environment must draft a detailed EIS. 57  
The EIS must assess the environmental impact, unavoidable adverse 
consequences, and alternatives to the federal action.58   Major federal 
actions in the NEPA context are those projects that will likely produce 
substantial environmental effects and that are subject to federal 
management and responsibility.59  “Effects” includes “[d]irect effects, 
which are caused by the action and occur at the same time and place[,]” 
and “[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in 
time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably 
foreseeable.”60 
Agencies must evaluate remote, but potentially significant impacts 
providing the evaluation remains grounded in “existing credible 
scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably 
                                                                                                             
 53 Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n. Comm’n, 444 F.2d 841, 851–52 
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (describing the function of the court 
in reviewing administrative decisions as assuring “that the agency has given reasoned 
consideration to all the material facts and issues[,]” and stating that where the agency has 
given the facts and issues a hard look, the court should uphold the agency’s findings). 
 54 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 
(1979) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976)). 
 55 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 
(1981). 
 56 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). 
 58 Id.  Calvert Cliffs Coordinating. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  The EIS process requires the applicant (the party 
applying to construct a nuclear facility) to submit to the NRC its own “environmental 
report,” presenting its assessment of the environmental impact of the planned facility and 
possible alternatives that would alter the impact.  The NRC will then consider the 
applicant’s report and prepare its own “detailed statement” of environmental costs, 
benefits and alternatives.  The statement then circulates among interested parties and 
agencies and is made available to the public, who will provide comments on the 
statement.  The NRC then prepares a final statement and makes final recommendations 
on the application.  When construction is completed, the applicant must repeat the 
process to obtain an operating license.  Id. at 1128. 
 59 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011). 
 60 Id. at § 1508.8. 
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foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment.”61  
Instead of extending the theoretical limit of the EIS to a “worst case” 
analysis, the Statement must focus on “reasonably foreseeable impacts” 
of the proposed action. 62   The “reasonably foreseeable” requirement 
serves the aims of NEPA by directing the agency’s resources at those 
issues of greatest concern to the public and the agency, rather than 
misleading the public by focusing on highly speculative and distracting 
risks.63 
C.  Challenges to the NRC’s Environmental Review 
Passed in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
provides a generic process for agency rule-making64 and a private right to 
judicial review of agency actions. 65   It also provides six separate 
standards by which a circuit court may hold an agency action unlawful.66  
A court may not overturn an agency decision merely because it is 
unhappy with the ruling.67  Rather, the APA ensures that the agency 
follows its procedures and that the agency decision is not arbitrary or 
capricious.68  So long as the agency takes a “hard look” at the federal 
action’s environmental consequences, a court will not supplant the 
                                                                                                             
 61 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2011). 
 62 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989).  Prior to 
1986, where “information relevant to the agency’s evaluation of the proposed action 
[was] either unavailable or too costly to obtain, the agency [was required to] include in 
the EIS a ‘worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its 
occurrence.’”  The CEQ removed this requirement because the “worst case” requirement 
overemphasized highly speculative harms, prompted agencies to exceed the rule of 
reason in their analysis of potential impacts, and proved wasteful of agencies’ time and 
resources, thus diverting the EIS process from its intended purpose.  Robertson, 490 U.S. 
at 354 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22; National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 50 
Fed. Reg. 32,237 (proposed Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22)). 
 63 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 356 (citing National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,624–15,625 (Apr. 
15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22); National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,237 (proposed Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 
1502.22)). 
 64 5 U.S.C. § 551–59 (2006).  A specific agency’s enabling act may provide a 
different process for rulemaking, and may preclude or channel judicial review.  In the 
case of the Atomic Energy Act, the APA provides the relevant administrative and judicial 
procedures.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2231, 2239(b) (2006). 
 65 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).  No private right exists, however, where review of the 
action is barred by law or the action is “committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 
U.S.C. § 701 (2006). 
 66 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 67 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1980). 
 68 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375 
(1989); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S 402, 413–14 (1971). 
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agency’s expert judgment with its own.69  Despite the broad deference 
courts give to federal agencies, opponents of nuclear energy frequently 
challenge the NRC’s decisions, claiming that it has not sufficiently 
fulfilled its NEPA obligations.  A few landmark cases brought by such 
interveners provide the historical and legal background to this issue. 
1. Metropolitan Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy 
When Metropolitan Edison, the owner of Three Mile Island, sought 
to re-license the plant after the 1979 meltdown, opponents of nuclear 
power and of the re-licensing intervened and the case quickly found its 
way to the Supreme Court.  The Court analyzed NEPA and the EIS 
requirements in what became a landmark decision for subsequent 
litigation concerning the sufficiency of EISs.  In Metropolitan Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,70 the Court ruled that an EIS must 
address a particular factor if (1) the factor is the type of effect 
proximately caused by the federal action,71 and (2) the factor is the type 
of effect that Congress intended an EIS to address under NEPA.72 
When completing an EIS, federal agencies must consider the 
particular effects of the agency’s proposed action that share a close 
causal relationship with that action.  Metropolitan Edison equated this 
relationship to proximate causation in tort law. 73   Mere “but-for” 
causation will not bring an effect within NEPA’s scope if a causal chain 
is too attenuated. 74  In the case of re-licensing Three Mile Island, the 
psychological effects that some residents and relatives of residents might 
suffer were too remote from the physical change that would result from 
continued production of energy, such as the release of low-level radiation 
and increased fog due to the plant’s cooling towers.75 
Thus, the Court in Metropolitan Edison read “environmental effect” 
and “environmental impact” in NEPA to include a “reasonably close 
causal relationship between (1) a major federal action (re-licensing Three 
                                                                                                             
 69 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 
(1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  The decisions that agencies make require 
evaluation of complex issues by experts with a high level of technical expertise.  “When 
specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the 
reasonable opinion of its own qualified experts even if . . . a court may find contrary 
views more persuasive.”  Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377–78; see also Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412; 
Balt. Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103. 
 70 460 U.S. 766 (1983). 
 71 Id. at 773–75. 
 72 Id. at 776–77. 
 73 Id. at 774. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 774–75. 
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Mile Island); (2) a change in the physical environment (the risk of a 
nuclear accident); and (3) an effect (potential damage to psychological 
health). 76   When a hypothetical effect does not have a close causal 
connection to the physical environment, NEPA does not require its 
inclusion in an EIS.77  Setting the stage for future discussions of what 
falls within NEPA’s mandate, the Court held that both tort law and 
NEPA require courts to “look to the underlying policies or legislative 
intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes 
that may make an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.”78  
With respect to the potential environmental impact of terrorism and the 
scope of an EIS, where to draw that “manageable line” became a 
contentious issue. 
The scope of an EIS must remain manageable in order to ensure a 
thorough and fully-informed decision.79  After the Three Mile Island 
meltdown, the NRC concluded that the risk of an accident had not 
changed since the publication of the original EIS in 1972.80  Even after a 
serious accident had occurred, finding that the risk of an accident had not 
changed was not an “arbitrary and capricious” decision.  Metropolitan 
Edison came to this decision by contemplating the purpose of NEPA and 
the congressional intent and policies of the Act.  The Court held that 
Congress did not intend NEPA to address the effects of accidents that 
occurred in the past, nor does its language or legislative history suggest 
that the occurrence of an accident could broaden the Act’s scope. 81  
Thus, the occurrence of a unique or traumatic incident does not 
automatically render that type of incident an “effect” or “environmental 
impact” required as part of an EIS.82   This limit on NEPA’s scope, 
coupled with proximate cause, provides guidance for its future 
interpretation. 
2. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii 
Notably, the year before it decided Metropolitan Edison, the 
Supreme Court issued a decision in a non-NRC case involving the 
requirements of an EIS.  In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 83  a coalition of environmental 
                                                                                                             
 76 Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 775. 
 77 Id. at 778. 
 78 Id. at 774. 
 79 Id. at 776 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1980)). 
 80 Id. at 775, n.9. 
 81 Id. at 779. 
 82 Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 778. 
 83 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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protection groups demanded that the Navy produce a “hypothetical EIS” 
for nuclear weapons that may or may not have been stored in a facility 
located on the island of Oahu.84  The Navy published a “candidate”‘ EIS, 
detailing the environmental hazards associated with storing, handling and 
transporting nuclear weapons, but did not disclose the facility’s 
location.85  The Court rejected the petitioners’ demand for a hypothetical 
EIS because such a requirement clearly departs from the NEPA 
requirement that provisions in the EIS be “reasonably foreseeable.”86 
The Court discussed the need to balance the goals of NEPA with 
national security.  Under the Totten doctrine,87 “public policy forbids the 
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would 
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as 
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be 
violated.”88  Thus, an EIS that reveals information sensitive to national 
security, such as the location of nuclear weapons, may not be disclosed 
to the public.89  Additionally, because the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) governs disclosure under NEPA,90 an EIS deemed “classified” 
pursuant to an executive order may be withheld from public disclosure.91  
Therefore, the NRC could withhold from the public an EIS that has been 
classified or that discusses details of possible risks of terrorism. 
3. Private Fuel Storage 
The NRC first rejected the requirement to address terrorism in an 
EIS in early 2002 after interveners claimed that in light of recent terrorist 
attacks, the EIS should “consider the environmental consequences of 
terrorists flying a fully-loaded commercial jumbo jet into the [Private 
Fuel Storage] facility.” 92   In Private Fuel Storage, an NRC 
administrative decision, the state of Utah claimed that recent terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington D.C. made future attacks upon a 
                                                                                                             
 84 Id. at 140. 
 85 Id. at 141–42. 
 86 Id. at 144. 
 87 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876). 
 88 Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146–47 (quoting Totten, 92 U.S. at 107). 
 89 Id. at 146–47. 
 90 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 91 Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143–46. 
 92 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 345 (2002). The NRC decided this 
case concurrently with three other cases raising similar terrorism-related issues.  Id. at 
343.  The discussion in Private Fuel Storage became the binding rationale for these and 
subsequent terrorism-related cases. See also Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, 55 N.R.C. 
158 (2002); Dominion Nuclear Conn., 55 N.R.C. 161 (2002); Duke Energy Corp., 55 
N.R.C. 164 (2002). 
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Utah nuclear fuel storage facility more likely. 93   The Commission 
addressed the issue by asking whether contemplation of the 
environmental impact of terrorism would serve the twin aims of NEPA.94  
An obligation to evaluate the risk of terrorism as an environmental 
factor, it noted—unlike reasonably certain effects on foliage and wildlife, 
water and air quality, and human culture and lifestyle—is unpredictable, 
“comes in innumerable forms and at unexpected times and places. . . . 
[a]nd is not a natural or inevitable byproduct of licensing[.]”95  Ruling 
that an EIS need not include a discussion of terrorism, the NRC stated 
that such a requirement would provide no practical benefit to the 
Commission, the environment, or the public for four primary reasons.96 
First, NEPA review requires contemplation of “reasonably 
foreseeable” impacts, 97  a requirement referred to as the “rule of 
reason.”98  The rule of reason does not demand examination of every 
conceivable effect of a project.  “Remote and speculative” impacts, 
“worst case” scenarios, “impacts with . . . a low probability of 
occurrence,” or effects too attenuated from the federal action to fall 
within the range of proximate cause do not require NEPA analysis.99  
The rule of reason serves as the manageable line between likely effects 
of licensing and those that are “too attenuated to require a NEPA review, 
particularly where the terrorist threat is entirely independent of the 
facility.”100 
Second, the Commission noted that the risk of attack on a particular 
facility is not quantifiable, and that any attempt to quantify the risk 
would be speculative, and thus would fail the rule of reason.101  Even if 
the risk could be quantified, the Commission stated, it would be 
miniscule and thus fail the rule of reason.102   Moreover, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the United States intelligence community, law 
enforcement agencies, and the Department of Defense all take active 
                                                                                                             
 93 Private Fuel Storage, 340 N.R.C. at 345. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 347. 
 96 Id. at 347–48. 
 97 Id. at 348 (citing Wyoming Outdoor Council, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 
43, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1286 (1st Cir. 
1996); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1993); Private Fuel Storage, 56 
N.R.C. 340 at 348. 
 98 Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), vacated on other grounds, 760 F.2d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Private Fuel Storage, 
56 N.R.C. at 348 (citing Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
 99 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 345 (internal quotations omitted). 
 100 Id. at 350. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 351. 
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steps to protect nuclear facilities and their respective local airspace.103  
These efforts, coupled with the existence of many other inviting targets, 
place the risk of environmental effects arising from acts of terror well 
outside the scope of the rule of reason.104 
Third, the Commission equated the contemplation of the effect of a 
terrorist attack to a “worst case” scenario analysis.  Both the Council on 
Environmental Quality and the Supreme Court expressly rejected the use 
of the “worst case” scenario analysis.105  The risk of a terrorist attack on 
a nuclear plant, the NRC admitted, amounts to a “theoretical possibility,” 
that falls short of the “reasonably foreseeable” threshold for NEPA 
review. 106   Supplanting a “reasonably foreseeable” analysis with a 
“theoretically possible” discussion would essentially revive “worst case” 
analysis, and could harm the public by unduly exaggerating a project’s 
risks.107 
Finally, the Commission recognized the need to keep sensitive 
information out of the hands of those who might use it to do harm, and 
that NEPA’s public nature conflicts with this national security interest.108  
NEPA itself contains a limiting provision, stating that the means utilized 
to achieve its aims must abide by “considerations of national policy,” and 
that it should exercise restraint “based on ‘risk to health and safety, or 
other undesirable and unintended consequences.’”109  In addition to these 
general limits in NEPA, the AEA forbids the NRC from disclosing 
security-related information.110  Based on these four factors, the NRC 
refused to require nuclear plant operators to conduct a terrorism analysis 
within an EIS. 
D.  The Circuits Address the Risk of Terrorism 
1. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission: The Ninth Circuit Rejects Private Fuel Storage 
In San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Ninth Circuit held that an EIS must take into account 
                                                                                                             
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354–55 (1989) 
(discussing the CEQ’s abandonment of the “worst case” scenario analysis); see also 
National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 
51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22). 
 106 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 352. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 354. 
 109 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006); Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 355. 
 110 42 U.S.C. § 2161 (2006); Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C.at 355–56. 
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the potential environmental impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
facility.111  In December 2001, only months before the NRC’s decision in 
Private Fuel Storage, Diablo Canyon—located on California’s Pacific 
coast—applied for a license to construct and operate a dry cask storage 
facility.112  Because Diablo Canyon’s original storage capacity was to 
expire in 2006, the plant could not continue to operate without the 
additional facility.113  San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, a California-
based organization concerned with dangers associated with the Diablo 
Canyon plant, intervened in the license board proceeding, urging the 
board to deny the license because the NRC’s environmental review did 
not discuss the environmental effect of sabotage or a terrorist attack.114  
In September of 2002, Mothers for Peace submitted a second petition for 
hearing on the effect of terrorism, expanding its challenge to include the 
security of the entire Diablo Canyon facility.115  The Commission denied 
their petitions under the precedential ruling of Private Fuel Storage.  
Subsequently, Mothers for Peace appealed to the Ninth Circuit.116  The 
Ninth Circuit rejected each of the four bases of the Private Fuel Storage 
decision, resulting in the first successful challenge of Private Fuel 
Storage and setting a binding standard on nuclear facilities located within 
the Ninth Circuit, requiring facilities to provide for the environmental 
impact of a terrorist attack.117 
Instead of relying on the Supreme Court’s “reasonably close causal 
relationship” standard,118 the Ninth Circuit applied its own holding in No 
GWEN Alliance, Inc. v. Aldridge, which held that an EIS need not 
                                                                                                             
 111 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 
1016, 1035 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 112 Id. at 1021. Dry cask storage consists of a stainless steel canister, filled with spent 
fuel, welded shut and enclosed in concrete “overpacks” that allow circulating air to cool 
the fuel. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Pacific Gas & Elec., 56 N.R.C. 413, 447 (2002). 
 115 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1023. 
 116 Id. at 1024.  Agencies have the discretion to use adjudicative proceedings to 
establish binding legal norms.  Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 203 (1947).  Because the NRC established binding legal rules in Private Fuel 
Storage, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision as a legal rule, instead of a factual 
finding, which would receive greater deference.  Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1027. 
 117 Id. at 1035; Tri-Valley Cares v. Dep’t of Energy, 203 Fed. Appx. 105, 107 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Tri-Valley Cares v. Dep’t of Energy, No. C 03-3926, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29437 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2007); see also Areva Enrichment Serv., L.L.C., 70 N.R.C. 1, 
5–6 (2009) (recognizing and applying the exception to the NRC’s judgment, which 
Mothers for Peace carved out as binding on facilities located within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction). 
 118 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 778 (1983). 
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address “remote and highly speculative consequences.”119  The court then 
held that the NRC’s determination “that terrorist attacks are ‘remote and 
highly speculative,’ as a matter of law, is inconsistent with the 
government’s efforts and expenditures to combat this type of terrorist 
attack against nuclear facilities.”120  Because the NRC had recently taken 
steps designed to combat or mitigate the potential of a terrorist attack, the 
court reasoned, the NRC did not consider terrorist attacks so “remote and 
speculative” as to escape NEPA review.121  Neither did the Ninth Circuit. 
Having addressed the Supreme Court’s causation standard, the 
Ninth Circuit then assessed the remaining Private Fuel Storage factors.  
The court observed that the second factor—stating that the risk of 
terrorism falls outside the rule of reason due to its highly speculative 
nature122—misses the point.123  Instead, the court stated that no NEPA 
provision, NRC regulation, or any other authority, case law, or policy 
statement allows the NRC to ignore an unquantifiable risk.124  Rather, an 
agency enforcing NEPA must take a “hard look” at the environmental 
consequences, even if they are unquantifiable.125 
The third Private Fuel Storage factor states that NEPA does not 
require a “worst case” scenario analysis.126 The Ninth Circuit in Mothers 
for Peace treated this factor as a red herring.  The NRC removed “worst 
case” review from its requirements in 1986 due to their speculative, 
                                                                                                             
 119 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030; No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. 
Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988).  No GWEN Alliance held that an EIS for a 
military-use radio microwave tower network need not discuss the threat of nuclear war 
that the network itself might provoke.  No Gwen Alliance, 855 F.2d at 1386.  The Ninth 
Circuit argued that the causal chain of Metropolitan Edison did not control because that 
case examined the requirement of an EIS in considering a physical change in the 
environment and its subsequent psychological effect, whereas No GWEN Alliance 
involved a federal action and the subsequent change in the physical environment.  Id. at 
1385.  Instead of following Metropolitan Edison, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an EIS need 
not address “remote and highly speculative” effects, and in language echoing 
Metropolitan Edison, stated that “the nexus between construction of [the tower network] 
and nuclear war is too attenuated to require discussion of the environmental impacts of 
nuclear war in an [EIS].”  Id. 
 120 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030. Examples of such efforts and expenditures 
by the NRC include bolstering security at its facilities, upgrading its security policies, and 
establishing the office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.  Id. at 1030–31. 
 121 Id. at 1031. 
 122 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. 340, 348–49 (2002). 
 123 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1033–34. 
 124 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting in part) (relying on Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 754 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
 125 Id. at 1032. 
 126 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 352. 
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wasteful and ambiguous nature.127  Because that “worst case” analysis is 
not required, the court believed that the NRC “wrongly labels a terrorist 
attack the worst case scenario . . . .”128 
Finally, the court dismissed the fourth Private Fuel Storage factor, 
which examines whether the disclosure of sensitive national security 
information would increase security risks.129  The court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s determination in Weinberger, that information that 
implicates national security may not be disclosed through NEPA’s 
processes, and explained that exempting classified information from 
disclosure in an EIS would not fail NEPA’s mandate because the public 
would not be prohibited from contributing to the hearing process. 130  
Thus, after rejecting, but not overruling, the Private Fuel Storage 
decision, the Ninth Circuit held that an EIS must take into account the 
potential environmental impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility. 
2. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: The Third Circuit 
Reaffirms the NRC’s Approach 
In direct opposition to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Mothers for 
Peace, the Third Circuit held in New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, that a nuclear plant’s EIS need not contemplate terrorist 
attacks as a potential environmental threat.  The New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection challenged the 2005 application of 
AmerGen Energy Company, the owner and operator of Oyster Creek 
nuclear generating station, for “the NRC’s failure to prepare an [EIS] to 
study the effects of an aircraft attack on Oyster Creek.”131  The NRC 
agreed with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s finding “that 
terrorism and ‘design based threat’ reviews . . . lie outside the scope of 
NEPA in general and of license renewal in particular.”132  In rejecting the 
                                                                                                             
 127 National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 
(2011). 
 128 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1034. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 1034–35. 
 131 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 135 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
 132 AmerGen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 128–30 (2007) (finding a possible 
hypothetical act caused by a criminal actor to be too far removed from the natural or 
expected consequences of re-licensing Oyster Creek; moreover, “a NEPA-driven review 
of the risk of terrorism would be largely superfluous . . . given that the NRC has 
undertaken extensive efforts to enhance security . . .” and numerous practical obstacles 
prevent meaningful NEPA review of the issue). 
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appeal from the NRC’s decision, the Third Circuit discussed the claim’s 
“two insurmountable flaws.”133  First, that the requisite “reasonably close 
causal relationship” between the environmental effect and the federal 
action in the EIS statement did not exist between Oyster Creek’s re-
licensing and the risk of a terrorist attack; second, that the Department of 
Environmental Protection’s demand for NEPA-terrorism review was 
redundant and provided no meaningful analysis of the issue of 
terrorism.134 
The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Metropolitan Edison, which required the court to “draw a manageable 
line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible 
for an effect and those that do not.”135  The court also found support for 
its position in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,136 which 
states that an agency need not prepare an EIS for actions, the effects of 
which lie beyond that agency’s control and responsibility.137  In both 
Metropolitan Edison and Public Citizen, the “manageable line” appears 
to encompass the boundaries of an agency’s area of control.138  Similarly, 
the Third Circuit cited to Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins,139 in which the 
Second Circuit denied an intervener’s request for a no-fly zone and anti-
aircraft defenses surrounding a New York nuclear power plant, as they 
were protective measure beyond the province of the NRC.140  Likewise, 
the Third Circuit denied the requirement for NEPA review of terrorism 
because the NRC’s inability to combat terrorism beyond its physical 
borders placed the matter outside of its control and in the hands of 
another agency.141  The fact that the NRC has taken precautionary actions 
                                                                                                             
 133 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 136. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 139, (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 
766, 774, n.7 (1983)). 
 136 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004). 
 137 Id.; see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139. 
 138 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011) 
(“Major Federal action includes actions with effects that may be major and which are 
potentially subject to [f]ederal control and responsibility.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 139 359 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 140 Id. at 161–68 (rejecting Riverkeeper, Inc’s claim that the NRC abdicated its 
statutory duty to protect the public health and safety because the agency is best situated to 
determine how its resources are allocated, and noting that the heightened level of 
protection required of the NRC is in no way “absolute protection” of nuclear plants). 
 141 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139 (stating that the Federal Aviation 
Administration and the Department of Defense respond to the threat of terrorism). 
Additionally, though not mentioned by the Third Circuit, the mission of the Department 
of Homeland Security is to “(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) 
reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; [and] (C) minimize the damage, 
and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States[.]” 
6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006). 
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to protect nuclear plants from terrorism does not bring the possible 
environmental effect of terrorism within the scope of a “reasonably 
foreseeable causal relationship.”142 
The court also expounded on Metropolitan Edison’s suggestion that 
causation as precipitated by a federal action parallels tort law’s 
proximate cause. 143   Discussing the concept of intervening and 
superseding causes, the court determined that a criminal or terrorist act is 
a superseding cause that places the effect of terrorism farther from the 
licensing of the plant.  Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts such 
effects cannot be anticipated.144  Ultimately, a successful attack on a 
nuclear plant involves two superseding causes: (1) the criminal actions of 
a terrorist, and (2) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration and 
the Department of Defense to protect the facility.145  These superseding 
causes place the environmental effect of a terrorist attack beyond the 
“manageable line” of effects that an EIS must address.146 
Additionally, the court reasoned arguendo that even if required 
under NEPA, the NRC’s generic EIS147 is not required to analyze the 
effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack. 148   According to the EIS 
prepared for Oyster Creek, “should the unlikely event occur, the effects 
would be ‘no worse than those expected from internally initiated 
events.’”149  This generic analysis, the court found, was sufficient to 
satisfy the hard look requirement of an impact, the risks of which “are 
                                                                                                             
 142 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 (referencing Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-
Violent Action v. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 143 Id. at 140. 
 144 “An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another 
after the actor’s negligent act or omission has been committed.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 441(1).  “A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which 
by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his 
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 440.  An intervening force resulting from a third person’s act or failure to act, 
or a wrongful act of a third person towards the other is an “important consideration in 
determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 442. 
 145 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 141. 
 146 Id. at 140–41. 
 147 To streamline the environmental review process, the NRC has examined ninety-
two environmental issues common to all nuclear power plants and has resolved sixty nine 
of them in a Generic EIS.  Id. at 134.  The remaining twenty-three issues are analyzed on 
a plant-specific basis by the applicant in its Supplemental EIS. Id. at 134; see also Notice 
of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the License Renewal of 
Nuclear Power Plants and To Conduct Scoping Process, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,209 (June 3, 
2003). 
 148 Id. at 143. 
 149 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 (discussing the Generic EIS from Oyster 
Creek’s initial licensing); see also 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B (2011). 
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impossible to quantify but nonetheless [may be characterized] as 
‘small.’”150  Because an EIS, under Metropolitan Edison, does not need 
to consider an impact that is not reasonably foreseeable, such as 
terrorism (despite the fact that the Oyster Creek generic EIS inherently 
considered these effects), specific analysis of the environmental impact 
of a terrorist attack would be meaningless and need not be conducted.151 
III. THE RISK OF TERRORISM IS NOT AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
“The purpose of an EIS is to inform the decision-making agency 
and the public of a broad range of environmental impacts that will result, 
with a fair degree of likelihood, from a proposed project . . . .” 152  
Knowledge of this information allows the agency to make a decision that 
considers all relevant factors and the effects of its action.153  An EIS that 
contains misleading information does not accomplish these goals.  
Likewise, information contained in an EIS that diverts the agency’s 
attention and resources from the reasonably foreseeable effects of its 
actions to those that are merely speculative and hypothetical does a 
disservice to the twin aims of NEPA.154  Such an EIS skews the ability of 
both the public and the agency to properly evaluate the consequences of 
the federal action.  By requiring nuclear facilities to conduct a detailed 
environmental analysis in an EIS for an issue as undefined, distracting, 
and speculative as terrorism, the Ninth Circuit’s holding not only fails to 
serve the purpose of NEPA, but it also creates public safety risks; 
violates Supreme Court precedent; and places an inefficient, 
unmanageable, and unattainable burden upon the NRC and plant 
operators. 
                                                                                                             
 150 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 143. 
 151 Id. at 144. 
 152 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 347 (2002). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv, 421 F. 3d 797, 811 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“Inaccurate economic information may defeat the purpose of an EIS by “impairing 
the agency’s consideration of the adverse environmental effects and by skewing the 
public’s evaluation of the proposed agency action.”) (internal quotations omitted) 
(emphasis added); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 235 F. Supp. 2d 
1143, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (“An EIS that relies upon misleading economic 
information may violate NEPA if the errors subvert NEPA’s purpose of providing 
decision-makers and the public an accurate assessment upon which to evaluate the 
proposed project.”). 
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A.  Metropolitan Edison Places the Risk of Terrorism Beyond the Scope 
of NEPA Review 
The Ninth Circuit disregarded precedent established by the 
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison.  The Supreme Court stressed the 
importance of proximate cause analysis and established the necessary 
chain of three events: (1) a major federal action; (2) a change in the 
physical environment; and (3) an effect.  The Ninth Circuit interpreted 
Metropolitan Edison as standing for the principle that the effects of a risk 
do not produce an environmental impact, but that the mere risk of harm, 
if the harm occurs, will produce an environmental impact.  However, by 
distinguishing the risk of an event from the occurrence of that event, 
Metropolitan Edison in no way suggested that the causal relationship 
between an event and an environmental effect, and between the risk of an 
event and an environmental effect, would be any different.  On the 
contrary, in describing the chain with respect to Three Mile Island—the 
federal action (re-licensing the plant), the physical change (the perceived 
risk of nuclear accident), and the effect of that change (potential damage 
to psychological health)—proximate cause analysis was pervasive and 
pivotal.155  The mere risk of an accident was so attenuated from the re-
licensing of Three Mile Island that the claimed environmental impact—
psychological stress—fell well beyond the manageable line of effects of 
the federal action.  The Ninth Circuit’s “quick look” misapplied 
Metropolitan Edison; causation under NEPA must begin with a federal 
action and end with an environmental effect.156 
Certain other environmental laws do not employ proximate 
causation to limit the range of effects that the EIS must discuss.  Where a 
statute requires only but-for causation, it states this expressly.  Likewise, 
where no alternative standard to proximate cause is laid out, proximate 
cause is the rule.  Consider, for example, the Clean Air Act.157  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the Clean Air Act, 
and under EPA regulations, the emissions caused by a federal action are 
those “that would not otherwise occur in the absence of the [f]ederal 
action.”158  The Supreme Court in Public Citizen stated that this explicit 
language amounts to a requirement for “but-for” causation.159  The Third 
Circuit recognized that in order for a standard other than proximate cause 
                                                                                                             
 155 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775 (1983). 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). 
 157 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
 158 40 C.F.R. § 93.152 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 159 Dep’t of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 772 (2006). 
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to apply, the law must establish that alternative standard. 160   NEPA 
establishes no alternative standard of causation; thus Metropolitan 
Edison requires proximate cause analysis.161 
In Mothers for Peace the Ninth Circuit also ignores the legislative 
intent discussed in Metropolitan Edison. 162   NEPA requires an 
assessment of the impacts of future events; it “does not create a remedial 
scheme for past federal actions.”163  Metropolitan Edison developed its 
EIS “in the wake of a traumatic nuclear accident,”164 but no provision of 
NEPA or regulation promulgated by the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) or the NRC allows for the expansion of NEPA’s scope in 
the wake of any kind of accident.  Just as the Supreme Court in 1983 did 
not allow the events of 1979 to redefine “environmental effect,”165 the 
Ninth Circuit should not have allowed the events of 2001 to redefine the 
same term today.  Additionally, Congress nowhere indicated an intent to 
give the NRC the duty to prepare an EIS for factors beyond its control, as 
the NRC “cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’” of the 
criminal acts of terrorists.166 
The Ninth Circuit further erred by applying its own “remote and 
highly speculative” standard from No GWEN Alliance, which essentially 
paraphrased and restated Metropolitan Edison’s “reasonably close causal 
relationship” standard. 167   Mothers for Peace, however, interpreted 
“remote and highly speculative” as a new causation standard, which it 
applied in lieu of Metropolitan Edison.168   Metropolitan Edison did not 
leave room in its decision for circuits to apply their own standards due to 
minor factual differences.  By supplanting the judgment of the Supreme 
Court with its own, the Ninth Circuit violated Metropolitan Edison. 
                                                                                                             
 160 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 139 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
 161 Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 775. 
 162 Id. at 779. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 778. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See Dep’t of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004). 
 167 Compare Metro Edison, 460 U.S. at 774 (reading section 102 “to include a 
requirement of a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical 
environment and the effect at issue. This requirement is like the familiar doctrine of 
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discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear war in an . . . [EIS].”). 
 168 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 
1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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B.  The NRC is not Able to Evaluate the Environmental Impact of 
Terrorism 
After the 2001 attacks on Washington D.C. and New York, the 
NRC began to review its security protocols and made a number of 
significant changes to respond to the threat of terrorism. 169    The 
Commission’s administrative decision in Private Fuel Storage based its 
conclusion in part on its scientific and industrial expertise, which 
deserves great deference.170  The Third Circuit properly deferred to the 
expertise of the NRC, while the Ninth Circuit supplanted the agency’s 
judgment with its own.  Mothers for Peace refused to defer to the 
expertise of the NRC on the grounds that “the NRC’s position that 
terrorist attacks are ‘remote and highly speculative,’ as a matter of law, is 
inconsistent with the government’s efforts and expenditures.”171  The 
Ninth Circuit erred.  The government undertook certain efforts in order 
to manage on-site safety, as required by law,172 but it did not and could 
not undertake to address an issue as large and complex as terrorism. 
The effects of terrorist acts do not fall within the province of the 
NRC merely because it has taken steps to prevent or mitigate the acts 
themselves.  Terrorism is a global issue within the jurisdiction of 
particular branches of the government.  The NRC is legally and 
practically suited to address on-site safety and security and direct health 
hazards, and to mitigate environmental impacts that concern the 
operation of the plant—terrorism is not within its ambit. 173   Neither 
NEPA nor the AEA mandate a counterterrorism mission, nor require the 
NRC to consider the result of independent third-party terrorist acts.   
NEPA requires the NRC only to conduct an examination of the effect of 
the plant or fuel-storage site on the environment, ranging from the 
minute to the catastrophic, regardless of any superseding or intervening 
cause. 174   By considering the entire range of possible environmental 
effects of a nuclear plant in a generic EIS, the NRC fulfilled its 
                                                                                                             
 169 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 170 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) 
(stating that reviewing courts should defer to the policies and predictions made by 
agencies within their own special area of expertise). 
 171 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 
1016, 1030 (3d Cir. 2006) (mentioning the steps taken by the NRC to combat terrorism 
and arguing that these efforts indicate an attitude that terrorism should be discussed). 
 172 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 73.1 (2011) (outlining the purpose and scope of the NRC’s 
physical protection provisions); 10 C.F.R. § 73.26 (providing for protection of nuclear 
materials in transit); 10 C.F.R. § 73.46 (providing for protection of nuclear facilities); 10 
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 174 See 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B (2011). 
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obligations under NEPA; indeed, in doing so, the NRC inherently 
contemplated the effects of terrorism.  The particular acts of terrorism 
themselves are best left to agencies with the expertise to analyze this 
potential threat. 
C.  A Terrorism Assessment will Endanger the Public 
“The public aspect of NEPA processes conflicts with the need to 
protect certain sensitive information.” 175   The NRC’s responsibilities 
include “protect[ing] sensitive information from falling into the hands of 
those with malevolent intentions.”176  Yet, an EIS that requires disclosure 
of the environmental impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant 
would threaten national security by allowing potential terrorists to access 
information that could facilitate their malevolent intentions.  CEQ 
regulations require agencies to furnish their EIS to any person who 
requests it.177  Contrary to the requirement that NEPA not subject people 
to risk or undesirable or unintended consequences, 178  “[a] full-scale 
NEPA process [that considers terrorism] necessarily would require 
examination of not only how terrorists could cause maximum damage 
but also of how they might best be thwarted.” 179   The NRC has 
recognized that keeping this kind of information secret is vital: 
[T]he public interest would not be served by inquiries at NRC 
hearings and public meetings into where and how nuclear 
facilities are vulnerable, how they are protected and secured, and 
what consequences would ensue if security measures failed at a 
particular facility.  Such NEPA reviews may well have the 
perverse effect of assisting terrorists seeking effective means to 
cause a release of radioactivity with potential health and safety 
consequences.180 
The AEC, predecessor to the NRC, rejected the requirement that the 
regulatory hearing process consider the possibility of attack on a plant by 
the country’s Cold War enemies.181  Without an order from Congress or a 
                                                                                                             
 175 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006) (declaring the policy of the AEA to protect public health, 
safety, and common defense and security); see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 
N.R.C. 340, 354 (2002). 
 176 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 354. 
 177 40 C.F.R § 1502.19 (2011). 
 178 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006). 
 179 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (No. 06-466), 2006 WL 2826275. 
 180 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 354–55. 
 181 Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778, 780–84 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
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statement of congressional intent, the AEC refused to bring such issues 
into the scope of its licensing process,182 stating that “to impose such a 
burden would be to stifle utterly the peaceful utilization of atomic energy 
in the United States.”183  NEPA is limited by its own language, which 
requires implementation only so far as it comports with “other essential 
considerations of national policy . . . .” 184   In this regard, the 
confidentiality of sensitive information is an “essential consideration of 
national policy,” as it protects against unintended risks to the public 
health and safety.” 185   Nowhere does NEPA permit elevating 
environmental concerns over other important considerations.186 
Not only would disclosure of terrorist considerations in an EIS fail 
to comply with the purpose of NEPA, but also such disclosure would 
contradict the safeguard requirements of the AEA.187  The AEA provides 
strict guidance and regulations concerning the control of information 
related to the physical protection of plants and materials 188  for the 
purpose of protecting “the health and safety of the public and the 
common defense.”189  Publication and distribution of information that 
might endanger the public would compromise the purpose of the AEA 
and raise NEPA’s environmental concerns above more critical concerns, 
in violation of Supreme Court precedent.190 
The Weinberger decision properly sets the standard for the 
appropriate scope of the EIS.  No GWEN and Mothers for Peace 
interpreted Weinberger to mean that NEPA provides no national defense 
exception, and that particular sensitive elements of an EIS may only 
remain private if specifically exempted under FOIA. 191   To some, 
                                                                                                             
because the AEC was required to focus on industrial dangers present to employees and 
the neighboring public, and a plant’s security against treachery, negligence, or incapacity, 
not on attacks by a foreign enemy—a threat shared by the entire public, not only those 
near nuclear facilities). 
 182 Id. at 784 (“We are unable to find any specific indication, within or without the 
corners of the statute, that the Commission was commanded to intrude the possibility of 
an enemy action into the concepts of the common defense and security and the public 
health and safety.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 183 Id. at 783–84. 
 184 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006). 
 185 See Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 355. 
 186 Strykers’ Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980). 
 187 See 42 U.S.C. § 2167(a) (2006). 
 188 10 C.F.R. §§ 73.21, 73.22 (2011). 
 189 42 U.S.C. § 2167(a) (2006). 
 190 Strykers’ Bay Neighborhood Council, 444 U.S. at 227. 
 191 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 
1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace 
Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 144–45, which addressed two particular exemptions: 
express statutory exemption and classification by executive order, and allowing parts of 
an EIS that fall under these exemptions to be withheld from publication); No GWEN 
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Weinberger may provide the ideal compromise: conduct an extensive 
review of the potential environmental impacts of terrorism, but keep that 
portion of the EIS confidential.  But this compromise fails to satisfy the 
twin aims of NEPA: to require the government to fully contemplate 
environmental effects and to assure the public that the government has 
complied with its administrative requirements.  Though an exemption 
from FOIA disclosure would still permit development of the EIS behind 
closed doors, it would fail a NEPA goal of informing the public that 
adequate review has occurred, because the public would have no access 
to confidential information conveyed during a closed hearing.192  NEPA 
is a dialogue between the government and the public that does not occur 
if the government prohibits the public from accessing the information 
necessary to participate in this dialogue. 
D.  A Terrorism Assessment Requirement Would Establish an 
Unattainable Standard 
Requiring a NEPA terrorism analysis would have two obvious 
effects: (1) it would expand the NRC’s NEPA review to a field in which 
its actions do not precipitate the environmental effect, and (2) it would 
effectively remove any limit on the scope of considerations which an 
agency must contemplate as “environmental impacts.” 
The NRC is the wrong agency to address the terror issue.  Power 
plants must follow safety and security procedures,193 just as they must 
consider environmental impacts. 194   Plant safety and security efforts 
protect against any threat, regardless of whether the threat is labeled 
“terrorism.”  Likewise, the EIS addresses all likely and probable 
environmental impacts of a federal action regardless of any intervening 
or superseding incident.  A discussion of terrorism in an EIS would serve 
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v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 635 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 193 10 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2011). 
 194 10 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2011). 
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no purpose because the NRC can do nothing outside of its own local 
security measures to prevent terrorist acts.195  Additionally, because the 
environmental effects that would result from a major accident (including 
a terrorist attack) are already part of the EIS, specific consideration of 
these effects when precipitated by a terrorist act would add nothing new 
to the environmental discussion. 
To streamline the review process and use resources efficiently, 
“[a]gencies are encouraged to tier their environmental impact statements 
to eliminate repetitive discussion of the same issues and to focus on the 
actual issues ripe for discussion at each level of environmental 
review.”196  The NRC already requires consideration of the release of 
radioactive material into the environment.197  Though the law does not 
require a “worst case” analysis, this consideration represents, in effect, 
the worst possible case.198  Consideration of the release of radioactive 
material as a result of an airplane crash would be superfluous.  The 
Second Circuit illustrated this premise in a 2009 decision, holding that an 
EIS that considered the risk of fire at a spent-fuel pool inherently 
contemplated acts of terrorism. 199   An additional, terrorism-specific 
requirement would be unnecessarily redundant and a waste of limited 
agency resources. 
The requirement that an EIS contemplate the impacts of terrorism 
would remove the boundary between proximate effects of a federal 
action and those effects too attenuated to be properly attributed to that 
action, due to the ambiguity of the term “terrorism.”  Absent 
Metropolitan Edison’s “manageable line,” the scope of the NRC’s NEPA 
process is virtually limitless, “subject only to the ingenuity of those 
claiming that the agency must evaluate this or that potential adverse 
                                                                                                             
 195 See Riverkeeper Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Glass Packaging 
v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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 198 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 351 (2002); RICHARD RHODES, 
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September 2001) consider the risk of fire precipitated by a terrorist attack, and classify 
that risk as low.”). 
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effect, no matter how indirect its connection to agency action.”200  No 
governmental body can ever completely and properly contemplate the 
entire breadth of a factor as vague as terrorism, which has so many 
varying definitions and manifestations. 201  As more threats are perceived, 
the requirement to evaluate the risk and impact of terrorism will grow 
larger.  Subsequently, the terrorism review will evolve from an analysis 
of reasonably foreseeable impacts into an analysis of imaginable risks 
and hypothetical effects.  Metropolitan Edison and Weinberger expressly 
proscribe such analyses.202 
E.  Possible Compromises 
Neither NEPA nor the AEA require or provide an effective legal 
mechanism for a terrorism review that would serve the purposes of either 
act.  The lack of a requirement to consider the threat of terrorism does 
not necessarily mean that the NRC should do nothing with respect to the 
effect of a terrorist act.  Unless the Supreme Court resolves the question 
of whether and how NEPA review is to address terrorism, there are 
several possibilities that Congress or the NRC might consider in order to 
bring the Ninth Circuit and the rest of the country under a common rule 
of law. 
1. Revive “Worst Case” Scenario Analysis 
As an option for addressing terrorism, the NRC could consider 
reviving a modified “worst case” scenario analysis.  In 1986, the CEQ 
removed the requirement that plants consider a “worst case” scenario 
from its regulations because “in certain circumstances [it had] been the 
impetus for judicial decisions which require federal agencies to go 
beyond the ‘rule of reason’ in their analysis of potentially severe 
impacts.”203  The CEQ replaced it with the current rule, which requires 
an evaluation of reasonably foreseeable impacts based on relevant 
scientific evidence and within the rule of reason.204  The NRC does not 
perceive a terrorist attack as falling within the rule of reason. Thus, no 
                                                                                                             
 200 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 350. 
 201 See e.g., Nicolas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: 
The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 255 (2004) (stating that federal law 
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1502.22). 
 204 National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
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requirement to address the possible environmental impact of terrorism 
within an EIS exists.205 
Despite this rule, a limited revival of “worst case” analysis—based 
on the actual effects of recent terrorist attacks—might appease both 
sides.  An outside party, such as Homeland Security or Congress, could 
identify from time to time the current worst case threat to nuclear 
facilities.206  Based on this independent determination, the NRC would 
then require all new licenses going forward, and perhaps even current 
licensed facilities, to analyze the impact on the environment if that 
possibility were to occur.  This option could also solve, or at least 
mitigate, the problems arising due to the many definitions and forms of 
terrorism.207  The requirement to analyze the environmental impact of a 
pre-determined worst case would free the NRC from the burden of trying 
to account for an issue as ambiguous as terrorism as well as from the 
shortcomings of analyzing only one specific type of terrorism.  
Establishing a worst case scenario that would logically encompass other 
events of lesser magnitude would serve as a reasonable compromise of 
these two extremes. 
2. Entrust the Issue of Terrorism Exclusively to Homeland Security 
Another problem with an NRC-based terrorism review is the 
NRC’s lack of legal authority to combat threats to its facilities beyond 
those facilities’ physical boundaries.  Numerous actions can potentially 
affect nuclear facilities; however, statutes other than NEPA govern these 
actions.  Merely building a structure that might appeal to a terrorist as a 
target does not itself create an environmental effect.  NRC safety and 
security regulations specifically provide for measures of protection 
around facilities, including the number of armed guards and their 
weapons training, vehicle stand-off distances, construction of physical 
barriers, etc.208 Though the regulations do not require that the structures 
be able to withstand sabotage or attacks by enemies of the United 
States,209 a recently created rule requires power plants to take every step 
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practicable to avoid or mitigate the effect of an aircraft impact. 210  
Preparing for a factor as a design-based threat, however, does not give 
the NRC the authority or ability to prevent the attack itself—that power 
must come from the law.211 
The NRC’s responsibilities arising from its AEA mandate are 
distinct from what it must contemplate as a “significant environmental 
impact” under NEPA.  The power and responsibility to prevent, protect, 
and mitigate the effects of terrorism belong to other federal agencies.212  
The Department of Homeland Security is not only charged with 
protecting the United States and responding to terrorist attacks, but it also 
possesses the legal authority to take action to prevent terrorist acts from 
occurring. 213   Under the proximate causation standard described in 
Metropolitan Edison, and Public Citizen’s rule that an EIS need not 
address effects which lie beyond the agency’s control,214 the issue of 
terrorism falls decidedly outside the purview of the NRC, and more 
appropriately, within that of Homeland Security.  Charging the NRC 
with the duty of a thorough terrorism review would not only give it a task 
outside its delegated authority and practical ability, but also would 
encroach on the duties legally charged to Homeland Security and other 
agencies. 
3. Institute a Homeland Security Impact Statement 
Just as NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the effects of 
their actions on the human environment and assure the public that all 
significant environmental impacts have been considered, 215  a similar 
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 210 Power Reactor Safety Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,926 (Mar. 27, 2009) 
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requirement that agencies consider the effect of their actions on national 
security—taking the form of a Homeland Security Impact Statement 
(“HSIS”)—may be in order. 216   Even though the consideration of a 
terrorist attack on a power plant would not discuss any environmental 
effect that an EIS does not already contemplate,217 the public has a valid 
interest in the potentially harmful effects that a nuclear plant could cause 
to the security of the nation. Though Congress and the implementing 
agency would determine the specific requirements of an HSIS, the HSIS 
would theoretically follow a similar procedural formula as an EIS.  For 
any major federal action, the implementing agency—or Homeland 
Security—would determine whether the action, if completed, poses a risk 
to national security.  The HSIS would examine these risks and advise the 
agency and the government on subsequent steps. 
Differences between an EIS and the proposed HSIS will likely 
arise.  Unlike NEPA, Homeland Security does not have a public 
disclosure requirement, so it could—and likely would—classify the 
HSIS in order to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information.  The 
HSIS would inform the government, not the public, that the government 
has properly considered the terror threat.  This non-public process would 
force the agency to take a “hard look” at the consequences of its actions 
while confining sensitive matters of national security to the appropriate 
forum.  Such a process would also serve the first aim of NEPA (ensuring 
thorough agency review) and may serve the second (public assurance of 
thorough agency deliberation) through disclosure to a congressional 
committee or an independent government body with security clearance. 
An HSIS, like an EIS, would not discuss the possible effect of 
terrorism on the environment.  The NRC would retain its duty to 
contemplate the environmental impact of its nuclear facilities.  The 
terror-prevention duty would clearly vest in another federal agency, 
freeing the NRC of any burden to review potential terror threats and 
contemplate a multitude of conduct-specific impacts.  The duty to 
evaluate the wide range of reasonably foreseeable environmental 
impacts, regardless of their independent causes, would therefore remain. 
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4. Broaden the NRC’s Authority and Obligations 
A final option, independent of “worst case” analysis or the HSIS, 
relates to Public Citizen’s rule that an EIS need not consider effects 
which lie outside an agency’s control.218  The NRC does not contemplate 
terrorism because it lacks the power to prevent certain large-scale acts 
that occur beyond its own premises.  Although the NRC is authorized 
and equipped to protect the immediate area of its facilities,219 it relies on 
the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration to 
protect the airspace surrounding these facilities.220  To some, a radar 
tower, no-fly zone, and missile battery may represent reasonable 
safeguards that a nuclear facility should employ to protect itself.  Such 
efforts, however, would exceed the line between the permissible use of 
force to stop a criminal act and the excessive use of force to regulate and 
intrude upon civilian life far beyond the boundaries of the plant.221 
Without the ability to prevent or influence a cause that would 
produce a certain environmental effect, that effect cannot be considered 
an impact of the construction, licensing, and operation of a power plant.  
An extension of the NRC’s authority—to permit it to protect the airspace 
surrounding its facilities—could subsequently bring the environmental 
effect of terrorist actions into the purview of the NRC.  Such an 
extension of authority, however, could also transform the NRC into a 
paramilitary force.  As the law reads today, the extent of the NRC’s 
regulatory power does not reach so far; the environmental impacts of 
terrorist attacks fall outside the NRC’s reach. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Until this problem is resolved, the Ninth Circuit will continue to 
impose its distinct requirement that EIS statements contain provisions for 
the environmental effects of terrorism upon nuclear generating stations 
and fuel storage facilities within its jurisdiction.  Such a regime will 
allow a handful of special interest groups to thwart the efforts of the 
NRC, the CEQ, and Congress to provide peaceful and prosperous uses of 
nuclear energy.  The Supreme Court has the ability to resolve this split, 
and should do so by affirming the Third Circuit’s ruling in New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection. 
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Barring intervention by the Supreme Court, Congress has the ability 
to closely consider the public interest and implement a variety of 
mechanisms to address this issue.  First, a limited revival of “worst case” 
analysis could provide a vehicle for a terrorism review.  Second, 
Congress could free the NRC of this burden by entrusting terrorism 
analysis exclusively to Homeland Security.  Third, Congress could 
require the agencies or Homeland Security to publish a Homeland 
Security Impact Statement.  Finally, Congress could broaden the scope of 
the NRC’s defensive capabilities and jurisdiction, and expressly charge it 
with the duty to evaluate the threat of terrorism.  Until either Congress or 
the Supreme Court acts, the NRC will continue to enforce its statutory 
duty as per its discretion in a manner best serving the nation, while the 
Ninth Circuit exposes its energy industry to ambiguous and unattainable 
disclosure demands, and its citizens to unnecessary threats. 
